In recent decades, Turkey has undergone a profound transformation in both its domestic and foreign policy. A country long presented as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world, a NATO member, and a candidate for EU membership, has, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, become a revisionist power systematically working to undermine the regional and international order it once benefited from.

 

Erdoğan, who became prime minister in 2003 and president with extensive powers in 2014, led a gradual but consistent process of power consolidation, weakening democratic institutions, suppressing the opposition, and politicizing the judiciary. A major turning point occurred after the attempted coup in July 2016. Since then, tens of thousands of judges, officers, journalists, academics, and public officials have been arrested or dismissed, thousands of media outlets have been closed, and Turkey now ranks among the countries with the highest number of jailed journalists in the world.

 

Alongside these domestic developments, Turkey has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, combining Turkish nationalism, political Islam, and Ottoman nostalgia. This approach, sometimes referred to as “neo-Ottomanism,” views Turkey as a natural regional power with a right—and even a duty—to exert influence in areas historically controlled by the Ottoman Empire, from the Balkans through the Middle East to North Africa and the Mediterranean.

 

Foreign policy also serves as a domestic political tool: confrontations with Greece, Israel, France, or the European Union are presented to the public as proof that Turkey “stands on its own feet” and refuses to yield to the “arrogant” West.

 

Erdoğan and the AKP no longer hide their aspiration to draw inspiration from the Ottoman past, presenting Turkey as a moral, religious, and political force defending Sunni Muslims across the region, supporting movements associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and seeking leadership of—or at least a senior position within—the Sunni world.

 

After the “Arab Spring” of 2011, Ankara actively supported Islamist forces in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Gaza. This support strengthened Turkey’s standing as a military actor in North Africa. In Syria, Turkey has conducted a series of military operations in the north since 2016, ostensibly against ISIS but primarily targeting Kurdish forces allied with the United States in the fight against terrorism.

 

The ongoing tension with Israel also fits into this broader picture. Since the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, Turkey has positioned itself as a leading voice criticizing Israel in the Palestinian arena, using sharp moralistic rhetoric. Alongside intermittent diplomatic normalization, Ankara continues to host Hamas operatives and allow political and media activity for the organization within its territory. This policy aims to cement Turkey’s image as the “protector of Jerusalem” in the eyes of Sunni Muslim audiences, even at the cost of friction with Western partners.

 

Alongside its Middle East activity, Erdoğan’s Turkey acts consistently in the Eastern Mediterranean, clashing with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel over maritime borders, gas reserves, and drilling rights. Since 2018, Ankara has deployed drilling ships escorted by military vessels to disputed areas, disregarding international agreements signed by Greece and Cyprus. In 2019, Turkey signed a maritime memorandum of understanding with the Libyan government in Tripoli, redrawing a maritime boundary that effectively cuts across the area between Greece and Cyprus—a move seen by the European Union as a blatant violation of international law.

 

These actions are part of a broader strategy known as the “Blue Homeland Doctrine,” which asserts Turkey’s extensive sovereign rights in the surrounding seas. This doctrine justifies military presence, diplomatic pressure, and even implicit threats against neighboring NATO states.

 

Ankara no longer sees itself as a minor NATO partner but as an independent actor committed solely to its own interests. Debates over Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO after the Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrate this clearly. Turkey delayed the process for months, imposing extensive demands regarding Kurdish activity within those countries, and used its veto power to maximize political and security gains.

 

At the same time, Turkey has in recent years invested heavily in expanding both its soft and hard influence in Africa, providing military training, security equipment, and educational scholarships, while building an image as an “anti-colonial” partner alternative to the West. The military base established in Somalia in 2017 is Turkey’s largest abroad and serves as a strategic point of influence in the Horn of Africa.

 

Turkey also acts consistently in the Balkans, strengthening ties with Muslim communities in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania through religious diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and indirect political influence. This activity raises concerns among EU countries, which see it as an attempt to destabilize the region and expand the influence of political Islam.T

 

urkey’s relations with Russia exemplify Ankara’s strategy of “cautious balancing.” On one hand, Turkey is a NATO member with the second-largest army in the alliance. On the other, it purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system in 2017, leading to U.S. sanctions and removal from the F-35 program. At the same time, Turkey and Russia cooperate in theaters such as Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus, engaging in both open and covert competition.

 

The war in Ukraine since February 2022 has further highlighted this duality. Turkey supplied Ukraine with Bayraktar TB2 drones, used by the Ukrainian army in the early stages of the conflict, but refrained from joining Western sanctions against Moscow. It has maintained active trade with Russia, served as a transit route for goods and foreign currency, and become a hub for Russian companies.

 

In Europe, Turkey extensively leverages Turkish and Muslim diaspora communities as a tool of political influence. Germany alone hosts over three million citizens and residents of Turkish origin. Through religious organizations such as DİTİB, effectively under Ankara’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, Turkey influences mosques, imams, and community life. European governments have also accused Turkey of spying on dissidents in exile and exerting political pressure on Turkish citizens living in Europe.

 

Moreover, the migrant issue has become a central bargaining tool. Since the Turkey-EU migration agreement in March 2016, under which Ankara pledged to curb the flow of refugees from Asia and Africa to Europe in exchange for financial aid and policy concessions, Erdoğan has used the threat of “opening the gates” as leverage. On several occasions, especially in 2020–2021, Turkey threatened to allow free passage of refugees to Greece, placing the EU in a severe moral and security dilemma.

 

The overall picture is of a state simultaneously acting as both a partner and a challenge to the West. Turkey does not seek to withdraw from the existing international system but seeks to change the rules of the game from within, exploiting Western weaknesses, divisions between states, and normative gaps. This policy complicates the formation of a unified Western line and allows Erdoğan to continue assertive, sometimes provocative policies without paying the full strategic cost.

 

Under Erdoğan, Turkey consistently portrays the West as a hypocritical, colonial, and Islamophobic power that preaches democracy and human rights while acting purely out of self-interest. This narrative is promoted not only domestically but exported deliberately to Western audiences—and especially to Muslim, conservative, and anti-liberal audiences.

 

Media outlets aligned with the Turkish government play a central role in this effort. TRT World, established in 2015 and broadcasting in English, presents itself as an alternative to the BBC, CNN, and Deutsche Welle. In practice, its programming consistently reflects Ankara’s positions, particularly on issues such as Israel, NATO, minority rights in Turkey, Syria, and refugees. Coverage of Turkish military operations in northern Syria, for example, is often framed as humanitarian protection for civilians, systematically omitting Western criticism or reports of harm to Kurdish populations.

 

Another important dimension is the use of ostensibly civil society organizations—cultural associations, student groups, and “intercultural dialogue” initiatives. Some of these organizations receive direct or indirect funding from official Turkish sources and promote messages aligned with the regime’s positions: emphasizing discrimination against Muslims in the West, denying political repression in Turkey, and portraying Erdoğan’s opponents as terrorists or foreign agents. Parliamentary investigations in Germany, France, and Austria have been opened regarding the extent of links between such organizations and Ankara.

 

In this context, Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) functions not only as a religious institution but also as a consciousness-shaping actor. Friday sermons, educational programs, and community activities in Turkish mosques across Europe sometimes include direct or indirect political messages, reinforcing a separate collective identity distinct from host societies. These findings have led countries like Austria and France to limit or supervise the activities of imams funded by Turkey