The Iranian regime is a revolutionary ideological system that does not view itself as a conventional nation-state, but as a historical–religious project with a regional and even global mission. Since 1979, the source of its legitimacy has not been popular sovereignty but loyalty to a theological–political doctrine rooted in the Islamic Revolution and the thought of Ruhollah Khomeini. Within this worldview, the revolution is not a completed local event but an ongoing process that must be exported, expanded, and defended against external and internal enemies. This produces an inherent hostility toward the West, perceived not merely as a geopolitical rival but as a cultural, moral, and existential threat to revolutionary Islam.

 

A defining feature of the regime is the complete fusion of ideology, security, and governance. There is no separation between foreign policy, national security, and religious doctrine; all are subordinated to a single objective: regime survival and the expansion of influence. The United States is viewed as the “Great Satan,” the architect of the international order Iran seeks to undermine, and Israel as the “Little Satan,” the West’s forward outpost in the Middle East. This worldview is not rhetorical; it underpins decision-making, legitimizes violence, and enables the mobilization of actors beyond Iran’s borders in the name of a continuous cosmic struggle.

 

The power structure of the Islamic Republic is precisely aligned with this ideology. Alongside a formal civilian apparatus operates a parallel revolutionary system embodied by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), originally created to protect the revolution from the military, society, and the outside world. Over time, the IRGC became the dominant force in Iran, controlling strategic military capabilities, internal security, major economic sectors, and key decision-making centers. In this system, ideology does not restrain power; it justifies it.

 

From these characteristics derives Iran’s external operational doctrine. Tehran does not seek direct confrontation with the West, which it recognizes as militarily and technologically superior. Instead, it pursues a prolonged campaign of attrition, subversion, and encirclement. The strategic conclusion is that the struggle should be conducted beyond Iran’s borders, through intermediaries, and in ways that minimize internal risk. This produced Iran’s core strategy: the externalization of conflict, reliance on proxies, and systematic use of indirect violence as part of a broader struggle over regional and international order.

 

The implementation of this ideology is carried out through the Quds Force, the external arm of the revolution. Responsible for building networks of influence, terrorism, and subversion abroad, the Quds Force evolved under Qassem Soleimani from a covert unit into a multi-theater operational command coordinating militias, organizations, and regimes into a unified system. Its activity extends beyond combat to political power-building, influence operations, and the creation of local dependency on Tehran.

 

In Lebanon, this doctrine reached its most advanced form. Hezbollah, initially constructed as an Iranian proxy, gradually became the dominant power within the Lebanese state. Possessing a precision missile arsenal, an organized military force, and decisive political leverage, Hezbollah can block any decision that contradicts Iranian interests. For Tehran, it is not only a threat to Israel but a strategic asset against the West as a whole, providing deterrence, leverage, and global operational reach under conditions of plausible deniability.

 

In Iraq, Iran concluded that infiltration through the state was more effective than direct confrontation. Following the U.S. invasion, Tehran invested heavily in Shiite militias, many consolidated under the Popular Mobilization Forces. These groups attacked U.S. forces, intimidated state institutions, and directly shaped government formation. Iraq thus became a state of constrained sovereignty, where Western actions require constant consideration of Iranian power.

 

In Syria, the ideology of defending the revolution translated into rescuing the Assad regime at the cost of Iranian military and political domination. Tehran mobilized thousands of foreign fighters, deployed multinational militias, and established a permanent presence securing a land corridor from Iran to the Mediterranean. This corridor represents not only a military achievement but a direct realization of Iran’s hegemonic vision and its strategy of weakening Western allies.

 

Iran also integrates Palestinian organizations into this framework. Palestinian Islamic Jihad functions as a clear Iranian proxy, designed to destabilize the arena, generate controlled escalations, and tie Israel and the West to the Palestinian front. Hamas, despite its Sunni identity, is likewise incorporated when interests converge around confronting Israel and the West.

 

Together, revolutionary ideology, a unique regime structure, and violent implementation mechanisms form a single, coherent strategy. This is not a series of reactions but a unified system in which ideology defines objectives and military, political, and cognitive power serves as the means of execution.

 

Iranian activity against the West within Western arenas combines covert terrorism, ideological influence, penetration of civilian institutions, and exploitation of democratic norms. The Quds Force operates through diplomatic missions, intelligence officers under cover, and local front organizations.

 

In Europe, multiple direct Iranian terrorist plots have been exposed, including the 2018 attempted bombing of a gathering of the Iranian opposition near Paris, orchestrated by an Iranian diplomat based in Vienna. Despite the unprecedented use of a serving diplomat as a Quds Force operative carrying military-grade explosives, the response remained limited and did not produce a strategic shift in European policy.

 

Iran has simultaneously conducted a quiet campaign of assassinations and surveillance against dissidents across Europe, including killings and attempted attacks in the Netherlands and Germany, and monitoring of exile communities in the UK and Scandinavia. Western responses generally amounted to diplomatic expulsions or condemnations, leaving the underlying infrastructure intact.

 

Alongside covert violence, Iran maintains extensive networks of religious, cultural, and “dialogue” institutions in Europe and North America. Shiite centers, cultural associations, and “peace” NGOs operate under direct or indirect Iranian state patronage. In Germany, the Islamic Center Hamburg functioned for years as an ideological arm of the regime before its closure, promoting loyalty to the Supreme Leader and disseminating anti-Western and anti-Israeli content. Similar cases were identified elsewhere, often without sustained enforcement.

 

In academia, Iran exploits existing anti-imperialist and post-colonial discourses. Conferences, journals, and forums addressing “resistance” and “anti-oppression” provide platforms that normalize Iranian-backed groups as “liberation movements,” while depicting Western states as inherently violent and illegitimate. This creates a cognitive barrier to decisive Western action.

 

The legal arena serves as another offensive tool. Iran cooperates with anti-Western states and organizations to promote investigations and proceedings in international institutions, particularly through UN bodies and NGOs. The objective is not legal victory but sustained pressure, intimidation of decision-makers, and erosion of political legitimacy.

 

Economically, Iran operates global networks of shell companies, oil traders, and smuggling routes to bypass sanctions and fund terrorism. Oil smuggling, alternative banking systems, cryptocurrencies, and money laundering through civilian firms finance Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias. Iranian-linked drug trafficking networks, including Captagon, further support subversive activity.

 

Africa illustrates how these components converge. In Sudan, Iran operated training and smuggling infrastructures under diplomatic and humanitarian cover. In Somalia, contacts between Iranian actors and al-Qaeda–linked groups reflected pragmatic cooperation aimed at targeting U.S. presence and maritime trade. For Tehran, sectarian divisions are secondary when the goal is harming the West.

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#Across all arenas, the pattern is consistent: Iran operates below the threshold of open war, using civilian, legal, and economic instruments while assuming the West will respond cautiously and in fragmented ways. While Western states compartmentalize terrorism, diplomacy, economics, and law, Iran integrates them into a single system guided by a clear ideology and centralized command.

 

Western failure does not stem from lack of information but from the absence of a systemic approach. Intelligence warnings, indictments, and policy decisions are treated as isolated events rather than elements of a single campaign. As a result, while Tehran acts through sustained strategic planning, Western responses remain reactive and piecemeal.

 

This gap is evident in the United States, where exposed assassination and kidnapping plots attributed to the IRGC have produced primarily legal responses rather than a comprehensive strategy. In Europe, the continued distinction between Hezbollah’s “military” and “political” wings enables fundraising and logistical activity despite overwhelming evidence of a unified command structure.

 

Diplomatically, Iranian embassies continue to serve as operational cover for Quds Force activity, yet closures and severance of relations are viewed as extreme. In multilateral institutions, Iran exploits coalitions to focus scrutiny on Western and Israeli actions while shielding its own conduct, signaling that there is little institutional cost for subversion.

 

The core issue is conceptual. The West treats Iran as one problematic state among many; Iran views itself as the center of an ideological camp engaged in long-term struggle. While Western systems separate security, diplomacy, law, and economics, Iran unifies them under a single command and objective. As long as this gap persists, Western policies will remain reactive, and Iran’s strategy will continue to advance without the need for open war or a decisive battlefield victory.