The states of the anti-Western axis are deeply invested in anti-Israeli activity presented under the guise of pro-Palestinian advocacy. Iran, Qatar, Turkey, and China operate through systematic influence over academia, media organizations, social networks, and public figures, with the aim of generating a toxic influence campaign against the State of Israel as part of a broader struggle against the West. Within this campaign, Israel is portrayed as a foreign and occupying force in the region, a direct continuation of European white imperialism. It is therefore no coincidence that at so-called “pro-Palestinian” demonstrations in the West, flags of the United States and the United Kingdom are burned, and that protesters express general hostility toward Western policies and values.

 

Political Islam also plays a central role in this dynamic. Wherever the influence of political Islam expands, a parallel rise in antisemitism and hostility toward the West can be observed, alongside explicit support for the Palestinian movement. As early as the 1960s, the Palestinian movement was established and used by the Soviet Union as an ideological tool to attack the West. To this day, anti-Western states, radical Muslim actors, and anti-Western organizations operating within Western countries identify Israel as the West’s primary enemy and hold it responsible for all global injustices, while portraying the Palestinians as eternal victims devoid of agency.

 

These same actors display a general aversion to symbols, institutions, and regimes associated with the West, while simultaneously admiring anti-Western entities and ideologies. Thus, alongside their hostility toward capitalism and the governments of the United States, they glorify figures such as Che Guevara and communist ideologies, without confronting the internal contradictions of their positions.

 

They do not seek historical truth or evidence to substantiate their claims, because their point of departure is fixed in advance: the West and Israel are perceived as the principal sources of injustice, violence, and moral decay in the world. Accordingly, they show no interest in the continuous Jewish connection to the Land of Israel, the uninterrupted Jewish presence in the region, or the fact that roughly half of Israel’s population originates from Muslim countries. They also ignore the reality that Muslim citizens of Israel enjoy full civil rights, or that the name “Palestine” is a Roman designation for the province of Judea, imposed after the suppression of Jewish sovereignty. In the same manner, they disregard the fact that Arab leadership repeatedly refused every initiative to establish an independent Palestinian state. This is because the essence of the movement is not genuine support for “Palestinians,” but confrontation with Israel and the West.

 

Between 1165 and 1173, Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela visited the Land of Israel and documented the existence of organized Jewish communities in Jerusalem, Hebron, Acre, and Tiberias. He recorded Jewish population figures, synagogues, and active communal institutions, reflecting a reality of ongoing Jewish life in the major cities of the land. His account attests to the existence of a functioning Jewish settlement as part of a continuous framework of life.

 

In the centuries that followed, Jewish presence in the land continued through permanent urban communities, even under difficult conditions of foreign rule, heavy taxation, and security instability. In Jerusalem, Safed, Hebron, and Tiberias, Jewish communal frameworks, religious institutions, and local leadership persisted. The survival of these communities relied not only on physical presence but also on an organized economic system—the halukkah system. From the 16th to the 19th centuries, this mechanism systematically transferred funds from Jewish communities in the diaspora to the Jewish population in the Land of Israel. These funds were used to pay taxes to the authorities, sustain families, maintain religious and communal institutions, and absorb new immigrants.

 

A notable example of Jewish attachment to the Land of Israel in the 16th century is the initiative of Dona Gracia Nasi. She worked to rehabilitate Tiberias, financed the construction of its walls, invested substantial economic resources, and encouraged Jewish settlement there. This initiative was not intended to create a temporary commercial site but to establish a functioning Jewish settlement in the Galilee. These efforts were later continued by Joseph Nasi, who worked with the Ottoman authorities to secure rights for settlers and strengthen the community.

 

Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, the Jewish settlement continued to exist and renew itself, as exemplified by the renewal of Jewish settlement in Tiberias in 1740 under the leadership of Rabbi Chaim Abulafia. Jews returned to the city, established communal institutions and synagogues, and the settlement persisted thereafter. Another example occurred in 1808, when the disciples of the Vilna Gaon arrived in the land and settled in Safed and Jerusalem. They worked to expand Jewish settlement in Jerusalem, purchase land, and establish neighborhoods outside the city walls, laying communal infrastructure as part of a vision of permanent settlement and nation-building.

 

In the second half of the 19th century, Jewish activity expanded toward productive economic development. Between 1840 and 1860, land was purchased and Jewish neighborhoods were built outside the walls of Jerusalem through independent financial investment and the establishment of public institutions. In 1870, the Mikveh Israel agricultural school was founded to train Jews in agricultural labor and lay the groundwork for productive settlement. In 1882, the First Aliyah began, and agricultural colonies were established. Land was purchased for full price, and despite harsh climate conditions, disease, and scarcity, the settlements were not abandoned but restored and expanded. Toward the end of the 19th century, wealthy Jewish benefactors—most notably Baron Rothschild—financed settlements, wineries, and infrastructure to establish long-term economic viability.

 

At the beginning of the 20th century, modern national institutions were founded. In 1901, the Jewish National Fund was established to acquire land for the Jewish people. In 1909, Tel Aviv was founded as an independent Hebrew neighborhood outside Jaffa and later developed into a Jewish city with educational, cultural, and economic institutions. At the same time, additional agricultural settlements were established as part of building an independent and functional Jewish living space.

 

The term “Palestine” was used historically to describe a geographic region only and did not denote an independent national entity or refer to a specific people or national group. Consequently, the Jewish community and Jews around the world used the term “Palestine” freely, openly, and functionally, alongside the term “Land of Israel.” The term appeared in official Zionist fundraising posters intended to encourage immigration and development, reflecting a purely administrative-geographic conception. Examples include posters titled:

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“Help him build Palestine”

“For the freedom of Palestine”

“Help free Palestine”

“Your Share in Palestine”

 

Similarly, many Jewish institutions, companies, and organizations incorporated the term “Palestine” in their names, including:
The Jewish Agency for Palestine, Palestine Maritime Service, Palestine Airways, The Palestine Insurance Company, The Chief Rabbinate of Palestine, the Palestine Salt Company, The Palestine Post, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, and the Palestine Electric Company.

 

In contrast, Arab leadership and society consistently rejected the term “Palestine” as a separate national identity. This rejection was explicitly expressed in official documents, institutional resolutions, and public statements by senior Arab leaders. Already in 1919, the First Palestinian Arab Congress in Jerusalem declared that “Palestine is an inseparable part of Arab Syria,” and a telegram sent to the Paris Peace Conference stated that there was no justification for recognizing a separate entity under that name. This position was reiterated in the resolutions of the Palestinian Arab Congresses held between 1920 and 1922, particularly at the Fifth Congress (1922), which stated that the name “Palestine” was a foreign administrative construct imposed on the region and did not express an Arab national identity. The Arab Executive Committee likewise presented the land as part of the Arab nation and preferred pan-Arab terminology over a distinct local identity.

 

This rejection was also stated explicitly before international bodies. In 1937, testifying before the Peel Commission, Awni Abd al-Hadi, a senior Arab leader, declared: “There is no such thing as Palestine; Palestine is an invention of the Zionists.” This statement did not address borders or rights but denied the very existence of a Palestinian identity. A similar approach was taken by Haj Amin al-Husseini, head of the Arab Higher Committee, who framed the struggle against Zionism as part of a broader Arab-Islamic struggle rather than a national movement seeking an independent Palestinian state. Arab newspapers in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa likewise tended to portray the land as part of “Southern Syria” or the broader Arab world and avoided cultivating an independent Palestinian identity.

 

This pattern of rejection continued in the years preceding the establishment of the State of Israel. In documents submitted by the Arab League to the United Nations in 1946–1947, it was explicitly argued that “Palestine” was merely a geographic term and that no separate Palestinian people existed. The Arab demand was not for a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish state but for a single Arab state over the entire territory. Only after the failure to prevent Israel’s establishment, and following the defeat of 1967, did the term “Palestine” begin to acquire a new national meaning—contrary to the explicit positions articulated by Arab leadership for decades.

 

The Arab response to the UN partition resolution of November 29, 1947, and to the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 did not focus on creating an Arab state alongside the Jewish state, but on a comprehensive military effort to prevent Israel’s very existence. Even before independence was declared, external Arab forces were deployed, most notably the Arab Liberation Army under the command of Fawzi al-Qawuqji. This force was a regional military framework recruited, funded, and operated by the Arab League to wage total war against the Jewish community.

 

Alongside military activity, Arab leadership called on the local Arab population to leave areas designated for the Jewish state or that had become combat zones. These calls were intended to allow Arab armies to operate without civilian constraints, based on the assumption that the war would end quickly with victory and the population’s return after the elimination of the Jewish entity.

 

With the invasion of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq in May 1948, the conflict became an inter-state war. Even at this stage, no Arab plan was presented to establish a Palestinian state, nor was any independent Palestinian governing mechanism created. Jordan annexed Judea and Samaria, Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, and Arab refugees outside Israel were left without a political framework. The Palestinian refugee problem thus emerged not from a premeditated expulsion plan but from a combination of initiated war, collapse of local leadership, evacuation calls, and comprehensive military defeat.

 

In 1949, the United Nations established UNRWA, a dedicated agency for Palestinian refugees. While all other refugees worldwide were—and still are—handled by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Palestinian refugees alone were granted a separate institutional framework with a unique mandate and definitions.

 

According to UNRWA, anyone who resided in the Land of Israel between 1946 and 1948 and lost their home or livelihood as a result of the 1948 war qualifies as a Palestinian refugee. The definition does not require citizenship, national affiliation, or permanent residency, and thus includes migrant laborers and temporary residents. This definition fundamentally differs from the general international definition of a refugee, which applies to someone displaced from a permanent residence who has crossed an international border and cannot return due to persecution or danger.

 

Another anomaly is the hereditary transmission of refugee status. UNRWA extends refugee status to descendants without generational limits, regardless of their citizenship, residence, or economic integration. As a result, the number of Palestinian refugees grows over time, unlike any other refugee population worldwide. Moreover, UNRWA does not promote resettlement or integration but preserves refugee status, treating refugees as a national collective rather than solely a humanitarian category. This policy transformed the refugee issue into a prolonged political platform and shifted responsibility from the Arab states that initiated the war and refused absorption onto Israel.

 

In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was established, yet no substantive change occurred regarding acceptance of a two-state solution or recognition of Jewish sovereignty. The 1964 charter explicitly denied Israel’s legitimacy, declaring that “the existence of Israel is illegal.” It made no reference to establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel and rejected territorial partition. “The liberation of Palestine” was defined as an all-encompassing objective rather than a limited state-building project, reflecting an early convergence between rejection of a political solution and adoption of revolutionary ideology.

 

After the Six-Day War, when the pan-Arab military paradigm collapsed, the Soviet Union became deeply involved in shaping Palestinian identity. Moscow recognized the strategic value of transforming the Palestinian struggle from a failed inter-state military campaign into a long-term ideological and psychological confrontation. The PLO was elevated as a “national liberation movement,” modeled after Soviet-supported movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Palestinian identity was reframed in anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, and anti-Zionist terms, depicting Israel as a Western colonial outpost rather than a legitimate nation-state.

 

The revised 1968 PLO Charter exemplifies this phase. It declares that “Palestine, within the boundaries of the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit,” thereby rejecting any possibility of a partial Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Article 9 states that “armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine,” and Article 19 asserts that “the establishment of the State of Israel is null and void”.

 

Following 1967, numerous diplomatic initiatives were proposed to establish a Palestinian state or a political pathway toward one, all of which were rejected by Palestinian leadership. In 1967, Israel accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 as a basis for negotiations based on “land for peace.” The PLO rejected the resolution because it implicitly recognized Israel’s existence. Shortly thereafter, the Arab League adopted the Khartoum Resolution (1967) with its “Three No’s”: no negotiations, no peace, and no recognition of Israel—thereby foreclosing the possibility of a Palestinian state through agreement.

 

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, American and international initiatives such as the Rogers Plan and the UN mediation efforts of Gunnar Jarring were proposed, all based on Resolution 242 and territorial compromise. They were rejected by the PLO for recognizing Israel. In 1974, the PLO adopted the “Phased Plan,” accepting the possibility of establishing a Palestinian entity on part of the territory—but only as a temporary step toward continued struggle. That same year, the PLO was recognized by the UN as the representative of the Palestinians without any commitment to a two-state solution.

 

The Camp David Accords (1978) between Israel and Egypt included a detailed plan for Palestinian autonomy leading toward statehood. Palestinian leadership rejected the accords entirely and boycotted Egypt, viewing the process as legitimizing a Jewish state. In the early 1980s, Arab initiatives such as the Fahd Plan and the Fez Summit resolutions (1982) proposed a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines, yet the PLO did not adopt them as final settlements, did not amend its charter, and did not relinquish denial of Jewish sovereignty.

 

In 1982, U.S. President Ronald Reagan proposed an advanced Palestinian autonomy plan as a step toward a final settlement, which was also rejected. In the 1990s, the Oslo Accords were signed, with Israel recognizing the PLO and agreeing to establish the Palestinian Authority. Israel accepted the principle of a Palestinian state as a possible resolution. Palestinian leadership accepted the accords as a process but not as a final decision, did not revoke the PLO charter’s core principles, and did not commit to ending the conflict.

 

At the 2000 Camp David Summit, a sovereign Palestinian state was proposed on most of the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital. The offer was rejected without a counterproposal, followed by the outbreak of the Second Intifada. In 2001, the Clinton Parameters and the Taba talks—offering detailed territorial division and permanent-status arrangements—were likewise not accepted as binding agreements.

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In 2002, the Saudi Initiative, adopted by the Arab League, proposed a Palestinian state and regional recognition of Israel. Palestinian leadership did not adopt it as a final settlement, maintained the full interpretation of the “right of return,” and avoided recognizing Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

 

In 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert presented another comprehensive proposal for a Palestinian state based on land swaps, division of Jerusalem, and international arrangements. The proposal received no response and was not accepted.

 

The Kerry Initiative of 2014 proposed a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines in exchange for an end to the conflict and mutual recognition, but it collapsed due to Palestinian entrenchment on two core positions: total rejection of Israel’s identity as a Jewish nation-state, as explicitly stated by Mahmoud Abbas at an Arab League meeting that year—“We will never recognize the State of Israel as a Jewish state”—and continued refusal to end the conflict. This completed a historical pattern of rejecting far-reaching proposals. In the decade that followed, Palestinian leadership primarily pursued unilateral action in international forums, avoided binding negotiations, refrained from defining agreed borders, and declined mutual recognition.