Political Islam is not a religious phenomenon in the traditional sense, but a modern political ideology that uses Islam as a source of legitimacy for power, control, and the transformation of national and international orders. Unlike Islam as a personal or communal faith, political Islam seeks to reshape the state, society, and legal systems according to a dogmatic ideological interpretation of Sharia, and to establish Islamic political supremacy over any secular, national, or liberal framework.

 

The roots of political Islam lie in the first half of the 20th century, most notably with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. From its inception, the movement presented a comprehensive worldview: Islam was not merely a belief system, but a complete system of governance—religion, state, law, army, and society. These ideas were given a more radical ideological foundation in the writings of Sayyid Qutb in the 1950s and 1960s, who described the modern world as a state of jahiliyya—pagan ignorance—and justified violent struggle to overthrow non-Islamic regimes.

 

Political Islam is not a homogeneous phenomenon, but all its variants share common core principles: rejection of the supremacy of secular law, opposition to liberal democratic values when they contradict Sharia, and a hierarchical distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Differences between currents are largely tactical—pace, methods, and willingness to employ direct violence.

 

One of the sources of strength of political Islam is the deliberate blurring of boundaries between religion, cultural identity, and politics. Any criticism of the ideology is framed as an attack on Islam itself, on believers, or on minorities, thereby silencing legitimate critical debate. This mechanism operates both in Muslim-majority countries and in the West, where fear of accusations of Islamophobia often serves as an effective barrier to sober political and security analysis.

 

In practice, political Islam exploits the freedoms of the West—freedom of expression, freedom of association, pluralism—in order to work against those very values. Mosques, charities, student organizations, and legal forums are often used as platforms for spreading anti-liberal ideology, recruiting activists, and building long-term political influence. This process is neither accidental nor spontaneous; it is frequently supported by foreign funding, ideological guidance, and systematic training.

 

Beyond being a socio-religious ideology, political Islam poses a direct challenge to the principle of state sovereignty upon which the modern international order is based. While nation-states rest on borders, citizenship, and civil law, political Islam operates according to a supranational conception, viewing the Islamic ummah as a single political entity bound by a unified religious law and ideological solidarity that transcends borders.

 

This approach undermines secular or multicultural states from within and enables divided loyalties—to the state on the one hand and to a religious-political ideology on the other. In extreme cases, this dual loyalty translates into subversive, violent, or legal action against the institutions of the host state. This phenomenon is particularly visible in Europe, where large migrant communities sometimes serve as active ideological arenas for Islamist movements operating beyond their countries of origin.

 

Iran represents the most prominent example of the full realization of political Islam as a governing project. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the regime of the ayatollahs has based its rule on the principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist), granting supreme authority to a religious figure above elected state institutions. Iran has not confined itself to shaping an Islamic regime internally; it has consistently sought to export the revolution: the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s, support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and extensive networks of influence in Syria and the Gulf.

 

Turkey represents a different but complementary model. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially since the second decade of the 21st century, Turkey has shifted from a policy of “zero problems with neighbors” to an ideological and activist foreign policy. The Turkish government has adopted Islamist-nationalist rhetoric, sought to revive Ottoman-era influence, and openly supported movements affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Libya, Gaza, and elsewhere. At the same time, Ankara has worked to restrict the activities of its critics in the West—including journalists, Kurds, and supporters of the Gülen movement—through diplomacy, intelligence operations, and economic pressure.

 

Qatar completes the picture as a financial patron, mediator, and shaper of narratives. The small but gas-rich state has become a central sponsor of Sunni Islamist organizations, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Doha hosts senior Hamas figures, provides refuge to Islamist leaders from across the world, and invests enormous resources in shaping a global narrative through the Al Jazeera network, which functions simultaneously as a news outlet and an ideological tool.

 

One of the defining characteristics of modern political Islam is its instrumental use of democracy. Many Islamist movements declare commitment to democratic processes as long as they serve the advancement of their ideology. However, once power is achieved—through elections, coalitions, or street pressure—a process of deep transformation begins: weakening the judiciary, undermining media freedom, and embedding religious legislation.

 

Egypt’s experience following the fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011 illustrates this dynamic well. The short rule of Mohamed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood figure, was accompanied by attempts to concentrate power, enshrine religious inspiration in the constitution, and restrict criticism. Although the experiment was cut short by a military coup in 2013, it demonstrates the internal logic of the ideology.

 

In the West, where direct takeover is not feasible, the strategy translates into gradual action in the arenas of education, law, media, and local politics. Islamist organizations work to build institutional power, generate political pressure, and influence public discourse—often in cooperation with progressive actors, based on temporary alignment against “the system”.

 

The information and cognitive domain has become one of the central fronts of political Islam in recent decades, especially in the West. This arena is low-cost and high-impact, enabling anti-liberal ideology to operate from within democratic societies themselves, while leveraging values the West regards as fundamental: freedom of expression, pluralism, multiculturalism, and human rights.

 

Al Jazeera, founded in 1996 with funding from the Qatari government, is a clear example. Although presented as an independent news channel, it functions in practice as a cognitive arm of Qatari foreign policy. The coverage it provides to Islamist movements—Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and at various stages actors affiliated with al-Qaeda—differs systematically from its coverage of Western governments or their allies. A recurring pattern is the portrayal of Islamism as “resistance,” accompanied by the blurring or justification of violence, while depicting the West as colonial, racist, and oppressive.

 

Beyond media, academia constitutes another key arena. Western universities have become centers of ideological activity not only because of academic freedom, but because of their influence on future decision-makers, journalists, and political elites. In recent decades, there has been growing penetration of post-colonial and relativist narratives that frame political Islam as a legitimate response to Western oppression, rather than as a totalitarian ideology in its own right.

 

Some of these processes are supported by external funding. Donations from Gulf states, “charitable” foundations, and international NGOs flow into academic departments, endowed chairs, Middle East studies centers, and student exchange programs. Frequently, such funding comes with an implicit expectation of a certain type of discourse—one that downplays Islamist antisemitism, global jihad, or human rights violations in Muslim countries, while emphasizing criticism of the West and Israel.

 

At the same time, sophisticated activity takes place through legal organizations and human rights groups, some of which have direct or indirect links to political Islam. These organizations use the legal language of human rights to erode Western states’ ability to defend themselves: petitions against security legislation, systematic accusations of war crimes, and attempts to expand the concept of “Islamophobia” to include legitimate ideological criticism.

 

Social media amplifies these trends. Platforms such as X (Twitter), TikTok, and Instagram are used to rapidly disseminate emotional messages, carefully edited video clips, and partial narratives, emphasizing victims, oppression, and asymmetry. Complex discourse is replaced by slogans, and violence is sometimes presented as a historical necessity or an “authentic” response to injustice.

 

A central component of the cognitive arena is the systematic adoption of victimhood discourse. Political Islam presents itself as the voice of the oppressed, minorities, and marginalized—even when dealing with movements that espouse authoritarian and violent ideologies. This discourse enables tactical alliances with progressive actors in the West seeking to fight racism, colonialism, and oppression—without scrutinizing the values of the new partner.

 

Thus, an ideological front emerges in which criticism of political Islam is silenced in the name of tolerance, while the ideology itself undermines those very values. This creates a profound asymmetry: the West remains committed to pluralism even toward those who are not.

 

Political Islam makes systematic use of migrant communities in the West as a base for political, cognitive, and sometimes organizational activity. Although not all Muslim migrants share Islamist ideology—and many arrived in the West fleeing religious or authoritarian regimes—Islamist movements operate within these communities to establish alternative leadership, build representative institutions, and frame Muslim identity in political-ideological terms.

 

The strategy includes establishing mosques, community centers, charities, and youth organizations that combine legitimate welfare activities with ideological education. In many cases, funding originates from foreign states or foundations with clear ideological agendas. This creates frameworks in which loyalty to a religious-political community takes precedence over citizenship, civil law, and liberal values.

 

Simultaneously, a political pressure mechanism develops: local and national elected officials are urged to “consult the community,” but in practice engage with vocal, well-organized organizations that do not necessarily represent the majority. In this way, Islamist interests are translated into decisions in education policy, “hate speech” legislation, or foreign policy—sometimes at the expense of free speech and national security.

 

Political Islam maintains a close link between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, even as it consistently seeks to frame this as “legitimate political criticism.” Foundational texts, sermons, and internal discourse contain explicit antisemitic motifs: demonization of Jews, conspiracy theories, and justification of violence. The 1988 Hamas Charter is a stark example, but similar patterns exist even in supposedly “moderate” currents.

 

In the West, Islamist antisemitism often manifests as violence against Jewish communities, terrorist attacks, threats, and systematic delegitimization of Jewish institutions. At the same time, there is a sustained legal and cognitive campaign against the State of Israel, portrayed as a colonial project that must be dismantled. Boycott campaigns, international legal actions, and academic activism cannot be fully understood without this broader ideological context.

 

The problem is not criticism of specific Israeli policies, but the use of Israel as a preferred target for eroding international norms: dehumanization, double standards, and the justification of violence. In this way, the Israeli-Palestinian arena becomes a central tool for recruitment, ideological cohesion, and expansion of influence.

 

Another defining feature is the gap between external and internal discourse. Toward Western audiences, Islamist movements emphasize human rights, freedom of religion, and equality; internally, they continue to promote religious hierarchies, restrictions on personal freedoms, and the justification of violence. This gap is not accidental but tactical—it enables operation within democratic systems while bypassing protective mechanisms.

 

The result is a complex challenge for Western states: how to protect freedom of religion and expression without enabling ideological subversion that threatens those very values. The failure to draw a clear distinction between religion and ideology, and between faith and totalitarian political activity, ultimately works in favor of political Islam.